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Fifty Shades of Brexit: Britain’s EU Referendum and its Implications for 






Britain’s vote to leave the EU has raised more questions than answers, which 
is ironic given that David Cameron’s aim for the referendum was to settle the 
European question in British politics. The outcome, which reflected a range of 
causes, leaves significant uncertainties overhanging UK politics, UK-EU 
relations and wider European politics. It is likely that the confused outcome of 
the referendum and the technicalities of Brexit mean that for both the UK and 
the EU future relations will resemble fifty shades of grey rather than some 
black and white division of in or out.  
 
 
The British vote to leave the European Union has left many in Britain, the rest 
of the EU and around the world searching for answers. In Britain, the debate 
rages as to why 52 percent of the British people who voted in the 23 June 
referendum backed the option to leave. British politics has been thrown into a 
period of change and uncertainty. Questions abound as to what the result 
means for Britain’s political economy, constitution, unity, democracy, 
identities, security and place in the world.  
The rest of the EU has not been spared from its own barrage of questions. 
Brexit has added to doubts about the EU’s purpose and unity thanks to 
continuing problems in the Eurozone, Schengen and with Russia, to say 
nothing of problems ranging from productivity through to demographics. Is the 
EU now more likely to disintegrate, integrate or continue a policy of muddling 
through where it copes with but does not solve the problems it faces?  
 
As so often in politics, there can be no clear answers to many of these 
questions. The debate is also still a raw one and, as we set out in the first 
section, there are competing narratives emerging to explain what happened 
and justify the choices that will now be made. This article therefore explores in 
more detail how Brexit is not an event but a process, and one that will involve 
numerous debates and negotiations, each of which will take place to varying 
degrees of intensity and at different levels in the United Kingdom, all 27 other 
EU member states, the EU’s institutions, non-EU European states and some 
allies such as the United States.1 To examine this, the first two sections of the 
article look at some of the emerging ideas about why the British people voted 
for Brexit. This provides context as to what approach the British government 
will take to Brexit. The article then turns to the structure of the negotiations 
that are now unfolding to define and manage Brexit. As becomes clear, the 
negotiations include multiple possible outcomes for all sides in terms of 
models for future UK-EU relations and their political, economic and security 
consequences. The drawn-out nature of the process is likely to dampen some 
shocks, although the possibility of a crisis leading to some form of ‘harsh’ 
                                                 
1 Grant, “Six pack of difficult deals”, and Oliver, “Brexit is about Europe”.   
Brexit (or ‘hard’ Brexit) should not be overlooked.2 As I therefore argue in the 
conclusion, the confused outcome of the referendum, the multiple possibilities 
and technicalities of Brexit and the protracted timeframe mean that for both 
the UK and the EU future relations will resemble fifty shades of grey rather 
than some settled, black and white division of in or out.   
 
Sifting through the Brexit fallout 
Why then did the British vote for Leave? Several themes have begun to 
emerge. First, nobody should be surprised that the British people voted to 
leave an organisation that for most of Britain’s forty-two years of membership 
had domestically been the subject of a largely negative, Eurosceptic debate. 
British politicians have long struggled to offer any pro-European arguments, 
preferring instead to make any such case elsewhere in the EU or around the 
world.3 Tony Blair, Britain’s most pro-European prime minister since Edward 
Heath took the UK into the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1973, was once described as an ‘anti-anti-European’ because he was willing 
to attack Eurosceptics but unwilling to go beyond this by actively making a 
pro-European case to the British people.4 Pro-European campaign groups 
have been limited in number and survived on limited funding and intermittent 
high-level political support. By contrast, while Eurosceptic groups have been 
divided by the intensity of their hostility to the EU and ideas as to what should 
happen to UK-EU relations after withdrawal, their numbers, resources and 
longevity have been much greater than their pro-European counterparts.5  
                                                 
2 Morillas, Brexit Scenarios, 12-17. 
3 Daddow, New Labour and the European Union. 
4 Donnelly, Euro and British Politics, 2. 
5 Usherwood and Startin, “Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon”. 
Cameron himself may have been overly confident he could overcome such 
long-standing unease and hostility towards the EU. A clear example was how 
he overlooked the power of a long-standing Eurosceptic press which, once 
the referendum campaign began, was relentless in its attacks on him and the 
idea of Britain remaining in the EU.6 In losing the referendum, David Cameron 
himself was reaping what he had sown. During his renegotiation of the UK’s 
membership he made clear that he would support the UK leaving the EU if he 
failed to secure the renegotiation he wanted. This was in part a negotiating 
tactic, but more to appease Eurosceptics in his own party. Yet months later, 
during the referendum campaign, he made the case that Britain’s membership 
was a matter of war and peace and therefore something that should not be 
jeopardised.7 The public, press and Eurosceptics quickly ridiculed his change 
of heart. But Cameron was not alone in thinking he could get away with such 
an attitude. Such contradictory positions were in large part the result of 
generations of UK politicians seeing the EU as an easy target by which to 
score domestic political points. Reversing decades of negativity towards the 
EU in such a short campaign was always going to be an uphill task.  
 
Second, many have pointed to the vote being a backlash by the ‘left behind’, 
communities and individuals who don’t fit in to the UK’s and EU’s globalised, 
open economies. There were links between economic circumstances and 
support for leaving the EU, with older, poorer, less skilled workers being 
amongst the most likely to have voted Leave. 8  Voters in deprived areas 
across the UK had long shown themselves willing to vote for parties such as 
                                                 
6 Korski, “Why we lost the vote”. 
7 Mance, “Leaving EU puts peace at risk”. 
8 Goodwin and Heath, “Brexit and the left behind”. 
UKIP. Despite the appearance of being a party that had successfully attracted 
Conservative voters, UKIP had for a long time been successfully pursuing 
voters in deprived and deindustrialized areas that had traditionally been 
strong Labour supporting areas.9 A political elite based in the booming, global 
metropolis of London was easily portrayed as distant and uninterested in the 
plight of the British working class. This was aided by the policies of austerity 
pursued following the global financial crisis that appeared to be centred on 
international banks based in London. The EU’s own recent difficulties, most 
notably in the Eurozone and the policies pursued towards Greece, also left it a 
difficult thing to sell on the doorstep. Back in 1975, the then EEC had 
appeared the future, an image that by 2016 no longer applied thanks to the 
stark contrast between fast growing emerging markets and a sclerotic 
Eurozone.  
However, the foundations for economic motivations for backing Leave were 
laid long ago and were not a reaction solely to recent events and policies. 
Large numbers of the ‘left behind’ were left behind by economic changes such 
as post-war deindustrialisation and the growth in the service (and especially 
financial services) industry that took place from the 1970s onwards.10 The 
turnout of ‘left behind’ voters in the referendum was the culmination of several 
decades of economic change.  
 
Focusing on economics, however, misses how the referendum result was 
defined also by views on what type of country Britain should be in terms of its 
values, identities and outlook. Support for Leave connected closely with other 
                                                 
9 Goodwin and Milazzo, UKIP. 
10 Davies, “Thoughts on sociology of Brexit”. 
divisions over values that cut across age, income, education and party 
affiliation. One noted comparison was attitudes towards the death penalty.11 A 
semi-skilled or unemployed voter who opposed the return of the death penalty 
was likely to vote to remain in the EU in much the same way as a professional 
or wealthy voter who supported the return of the death penalty was likely to 
vote for Leave. 12  Two areas in particular were of note: immigration and 
Englishness. Immigration had been driven up the UK’s political agenda by the 
arrival of large numbers of Eastern Europeans following the EU’s 2004 
enlargement. Britain had been one of only a few EU member states not to 
impose any restrictions on free movement following 2004.13 The result was a 
period of high levels of immigration to the UK. Whether this led directly to a 
surge in Euroscepticism is debated because areas where immigrants settled 
tended to show low levels of support for UKIP.14 This demonstrated that in 
some areas support for parties such as UKIP and anti-immigration policies 
could be based more on an imagined or exaggerated fear of immigrants 
taking jobs or adding to pressures on local services such as doctors or school 
places. However, this only goes so far given that some areas that backed 
leave had seen increases in levels of immigration unprecedented in their 
history.15 The Conservative government’s promise to achieve its stated aim of 
lowering immigration to the ‘tens of thousands’ had also created expectations 
                                                 
11 Kaufmann, “It’s NOT the economy, stupid”.  
12 Burton, “Link between Brexit and death penalty”. 
13 Vargos-Silva and Markaki, EU migration, 2. 
14 Dodds and Akkoc, “Where is UKIP’s support strongest?”.  
15 “The immigration paradox: explaining the Brexit vote”, The Economist, 16 July 2016.   
that were always going to be difficult to fulfill given the high levels of 
immigration from both inside and outside the EU.16  
That notable levels of support for Leave were also found in large cities such 
as London or Manchester – where immigration had long been a norm – also 
shows how something else was at work. One aspect of the vote that shone 
through was the rise of English nationalism.17 England has long struggled to 
define itself within a UK where English and British identities overlap. That 
England lacks its own parliament or distinct political system compared to 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and, to some extent, the global metropolis 
of Greater London, has helped drive the issue of England up the UK’s political 
agenda.18 One outcome, as Ben Wellings has argued, is that “Euroscepticism 
is the most formed-up expression of English grievance and an ideology that 
provides the political content for English nationalism.”19 This is not to claim 
that English nationalism and Euroscepticism are an automatic connection.20 
Nor is it to maintain that the non-English parts of the Union did not show signs 
of support for Leave. 52.5 percent of Welsh voters backed Leave. Even in 
Scotland support for Leave registered as 38 percent, a figure expected to be 
much lower and a reminder that Scottish pro-Europeanism has its limits. 
Nevertheless, the connection between English nationalism and 
Euroscepticism was one example of why the Leave campaign were able to 
draw on support from issues that reached beyond the narrower arguments 
                                                 
16 “Net migration to UK rises to 330,000 – second highest on record”, BBC News, 26 May 
2016.  
17 Henderson et al., “England, Englishness and Brexit”. 
18 Barnett, “It’s England’s Brexit”.  
19 Wellings, “English nationalism and Euroscepticism overlap”. 
20 Kenny, “Idea that nationalism powered Brexit unduly simplistic”. 
deployed by the Remain campaign, namely benefits connected to trade and 
wealth.  
 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ means what? 
 
One prominent aspect of the successful Leave campaigns was the call for the 
British people to ‘take back control’, a message that resonated with a range of 
people whether economically disenfranchised, worried about threats to their 
identities or uneasy about the EU’s direction as shown in the policies within 
the Eurozone. But in voting to take back control by voting for Leave, it is 
unclear what the British people actually voted for. There was no clear post-
vote plan for Brexit. When, two weeks after the referendum, the Chilcot 
Report into the Iraq War offered a damning critique of the lack of UK 
government planning for Iraq after the 2003 conflict, it led the Guardian to 
note that Leave campaigners had also achieved a victory with no plan, “as 
clueless about post-Brexit Britain as Bush and Blair were about post-invasion 
Iraq”.21 This was in part because some Leave campaigners such as Boris 
Johnson and Michael Gove may not have expected to win, and were instead 
using the referendum as a means to an end of advancing their own careers 
within the Conservative party. It also in part reflected the incredible difficulty of 
developing a plan because a credible one could only be drawn up in 
cooperation with the other members of the EU as they would eventually have 
to agree to any new relationship.  
                                                 
21 Freedland, “Warning to Gove and Johnson”.  
The outcome of the vote has therefore been growing frustration and anger. 
Initially the anger was to be found amongst Remain voters. One survey found 
that almost half of 18-24 year olds who voted for Remain (and they were the 
group most likely to have backed Remain) were left feeling distraught by the 
result.22 Frustrations also began to show on the Leave side because of the 
possible delays to any exit. As shown by the reaction to the High Court’s 
ruling that Parliament and not the government must control the triggering of 
article 50 (the EU’s withdrawal clause), frustrations on the Leave side are 
likely to grow if efforts to take back control turn out to be not as 
straightforward or quick as they were made to sound during the campaign.23 
 
Leaving the EU is unlikely to make much of a difference to a number of the 
reasons that drove people to vote for Leave.24 Leaving the EU is not going to 
bring about economic change for deprived areas, it could even accentuate 
them with areas such as London continuing to thrive thanks to their 
international links and more diversified economies. 25  Nor will it settle 
arguments about England’s position within the UK, or divisions between urban 
and rural areas and especially between a global London and the rest of 
England. Arguments about austerity and funding the National Health Service 
(NHS) transcend the EU topic, reaching deep into divisions over political 
economy between and within the political parties. The Leave campaign 
seemed to operate on a mantra of ‘nothing is true but everything is possible’. 
The infamous £350 million the official Leave campaign claimed was paid by 
                                                 
22 Helm, “Young Remain voters reduced to tears”. 
23 Cowburn, “Brexit ‘could be delayed’”; Snowdon, “High Court’s decision sparks reactions”.  
24 Oliver, “To be or not to be”.  
25 Springford et al., “Brexiting yourself in the foot”. 
the UK to the EU each week was a bogus figure and therefore cannot now, as 
they argued, be spent on the NHS.26 A decline in immigration could happen, 
but not before a possible surge from within the EU in advance of the UK 
formally withdrawing.27 Immigration from outside the EU is unlikely to decline 
significantly unless the UK economy goes into free-fall or Britain severely 
tightens its immigration policies, in doing so reversing a long-standing policy 
of openness. The outcome could be that low levels of trust and confidence in 
Britain’s political institutions can only decline further. It will be an anger that 
UKIP, or another party that draws heavily on an anti-politics vote, could feed 
off. 
 
In trying to simplify a complex issue, the referendum was bound to fail. As 
Europe’s predominant organisation for politics, economics and non-traditional 
security, the EU is like the mythical Hotel California the Eagles sang about: 
“You can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave.” Defining 
Leave and Remain is all about degrees of separation, rather than some clear 
in/out choice as it was sold by both sides of the campaign. A vote to Remain 
would have meant the UK maintaining its position of semi-committed 
membership, leaving the rest of the EU to develop without it, albeit one where 
the rest of the EU would need to adapt with the UK on the inside. The Leave 
option means formally placing the UK outside the structures of the EU, which 
entails some formal departure on a set date. While a ‘hard Brexit’, whereby 
the UK leaves the EU with no deal and takes up a WTO style relationship with 
the EU should not be overlooked (indeed, the UK government has hinted it is 
                                                 
26 Emmerson et al., Brexit and UK’s Public Finances. 
27 Home Affairs Committee, Work of Immigration Directorates, 5-6. 
prepared to pursue such an outcome), the economic and political shock would 
not sever all the links between Britain and the EU. 28  Britain will remain 
connected to the rest of the EU in a wide range of areas and bound or 
influenced by the decisions taken within it. Even if a ‘hard Brexit’ occurs or 
economic links decline significantly, the politics and security of Europe – 
which today is in large part (but not wholly) defined by the EU – will, as they 
have always been, remain the main reference point for British politics and 
foreign policy. 29  As Sir Winston Churchill argued, Europe is where the 
weather comes from. 
 
Brexit Part Deux 
 
In the run-up to the 23 June vote, neither the British government nor the rest 
of the EU were prepared to contemplate a vote for Leave, in part because it 
might send a signal that a victory for the Leave campaigns was a possibility 
they took seriously. 30  While after the vote the British government was 
criticised for having no contingency plans in place, the lack of planning for 
Brexit by the Leave campaigns had been highlighted during the campaign. A 
common line of attack by the Remain campaigns was the inability of the 
various Leave campaigns to agree on what a future UK-EU relationship would 
look like. The Leave campaigns’ inability to agree was compounded by the 
fact that whatever models they variously put forward, their realisation would 
depend just as much on what the rest of the EU (and in some cases other 
                                                 
28 Wolf, “May Limbers up for Hard Brexit”.   
29 Simms, Britain’s Europe. 
30 Foreign Affairs Committee, Equipping the Government for Brexit, 9-10. 
countries around the world) would agree to as it would on what the UK might 
like to see happen.  
 
This means that further votes and a series of debates are now unfolding 
which will collectively define the meaning of Brexit. 31  The first set of 
negotiations and votes are taking place within the UK. There is an ongoing 
fight to define what the British people voted for when they backed Leave, a 
fight being played out in the media, political parties, academia and 
international commentaries. The most important forum will be the House of 
Commons where the UK government will at some point have to ask MPs to 
vote to put Brexit into law and in doing so define what the UK is seeking and 
prepared to accept by way of an exit and post-withdrawal relationship with the 
EU. In addition to this, debates will play out surrounding negotiations between 
the UK government and Scotland, London and Northern Ireland, all of which 
voted for Remain. Each will seek to protect their interests in ways that could 
reshape the UK. Scottish nationalists could use Brexit to push for another 
Scottish independence referendum. Northern Ireland’s peace process has in 
part been built on the UK and Ireland’s shared membership of the EU. 
London, the political and economic heart of the UK, finds itself a capital city at 
odds with the country it governs and dominates, a feeling of separation many 
elsewhere in England have increasingly felt towards it. Meanwhile, the UK will 
need to engage in discussions with non-EU partners such as the US, 
emerging markets such as China and organisations such as the WTO about 
where Britain will stand vis-à-vis each of them as it leaves the EU. 
                                                 
31 Grant, “Six pack of difficult deals”, and Strong, “Brexit debate is far from over”. 
 A second set of negotiations and votes will revolve around UK-EU 
negotiations. The first will be over an exit agreement and a possible transition 
arrangement to provide both the UK and the EU with more time than the two-
year timeframe allowed by Article 50. A transition arrangement, for example a 
ten-year membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) similar to that 
held by Norway, could provide the UK and EU with the time needed to 
negotiate a full post-withdrawal relationship.32  
What a post-withdrawal relationship might look like has been the subject of a 
great deal of speculation in the UK.33 Models range from the EEA model, 
some special tailor-made agreement, through to no deal where the UK falls 
back on relations with the EU as guaranteed by WTO membership. The 
speculation has long suffered a glaring omission, which is that it is focused 
almost entirely on what might be the best deal for the UK and less on what 
would be good for the remaining EU. As negotiations unfold, a great deal of 
political attention will focus less on what UK politicians want and more on 
what the remaining EU is prepared to grant.34  
Finding a position acceptable to the EU will be one of the biggest challenges 
for both the UK and the rest of the EU. Each of the 27 EU member states will 
have its own position, as will the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. The positions of the European Court of Justice and non-EU 
states such as Norway and Switzerland will also need to be taken into 
account as, depending on the type of deal put forward, they may have the 
right of veto or delay. Should all member states have to ratify the agreement 
                                                 
32 Chalmers and Menon, Getting out quick. 
33 See, for example, Booth and Howarth, Trading Places. 
34 Oliver, Brexit: what happens next? 
individually through their domestic processes, then the probability of rejection 
by a national referendum or vote in a national parliament is very high.35 
Various member states also have national elections due over the next few 
years, elections where positions over Brexit could become a topic of debate. 
This will require Britain to undertake a considerable diplomatic lobbying effort, 
something the Foreign and Commonwealth Office may not be in a position to 
do, thanks to years of cuts to UK diplomatic representation across the EU.36  
One area where the UK and to some extent the rest of the EU may find a way 
forward in maintaining close relations, and therefore building trust and 
confidence in relations to compensate for strains over arguments about future 
relations in economics or free movement, is in the areas of foreign, security 
and defence.37 However, as discussed further below, all sides will need to 
come to terms with the fact that none of the various models can create a set 
structure for UK-EU relations. Both the EU and the UK face an uncertain 
future because the EU will remain in a state of flux and the UK will be 
confronted by its own changing needs and political outlooks.    
 
A final set of negotiations to define Brexit will unfold within the remaining EU. 
While the remaining 27 members, along with institutions such as the 
European Parliament, are trying to reach agreement over what to offer to the 
departing UK, they will also be negotiating over the shift in the balance of 
power within the Union created by the departure of one of its largest 
members. Such shifts will be heavily influenced by ongoing efforts to deal with 
the problems facing the Eurozone and Schengen. There are four ways the EU 
                                                 
35 Rankin, “Britain must learn from CETA”.  
36 Foreign Affairs Committee, Equipping the Government for Brexit. 
37 Van Ham, Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe. 
could deal with these problems: further integration, muddling through, 
disintegration, or some radical reduction and reordering of the Union.38  
Further integration will be difficult to secure politically, but is deemed 
necessary if the Eurozone is to find a way out of the impasse it is currently in. 
A similar fate hangs over Schengen. So far the EU has tended to muddle 
through, coping but not solving the problems it faces. Brexit may not change 
this because Britain’s traditional awkwardness in the Union has been 
increasingly limited by its self-imposed exclusion from both the euro and 
Schengen. Could Brexit therefore trigger the EU’s disintegration or some 
reordering so that a smaller EU focused around Germany and a few other 
states emerges? Here one of the most important factors will be the attitude of 
Germany, not the UK.39 Britain has been increasingly peripheral to the EU in 
terms of defining integration. Coping with Brexit is, by itself, unlikely to be the 
biggest test of the EU’s unity, unless it aligns with crises in the Eurozone or 
Schengen. While Britain will remain a European power of some standing, 
managing relations with it will be played out in a framework of an EU in an 
emerging multipolar world. Further European divisions could open up the 
possibility of a ‘multipolar Europe’ in which Britain, Russia and Turkey 
surround the collectively more powerful, but less united, EU.40 If this took 
place in a multipolar world, emerging powers could seek to use Brexit to add 
to a divided Europe as opposed to a Europe that collectively – through 
organisations such as the EU, NATO or other arrangements – is a pillar of 
world politics.41  
                                                 
38 Oliver, What impact would Brexit have. 
39 Webber, “How likely is it?”. 
40 Krastev and Leonard, Spectre of a Multipolar Europe.  
41 Techau, “Europe torn apart in Asian century?”. 
 Fifty Shades of Brexit 
 
As discussed above, how the rest of the EU would react to Brexit was largely 
overlooked in the UK’s referendum and has only slowly become an issue in 
the UK’s debate over how to define and implement Brexit. To be fair, the idea 
was also overlooked elsewhere in the EU where the idea of a member state 
withdrawing was a taboo, a challenge to a belief in ‘ever closer union’ as a 
forward moving, progressive process. Thinking about Brexit was also made 
difficult by the EU’s place as Europe’s predominant organisation for 
economics, politics, social matters and non-traditional security cooperation. 
Non-membership of such an organisation by a European state, especially one 
as large as the UK, could appear nonsensical. Such an outlook runs the risk 
of taking a myopic view of the EU’s permanence but, unless the EU implodes, 
its place and power will be a reality of European politics that Britain will 
struggle to ignore. Similarly, the UK is not going to disappear from the politics 
of the EU and Europe. While Britain’s ability to divide and rule the rest of the 
EU should not be overplayed, it is worth remembering that the EU struggles to 
maintain unified positions in its relations with states ranging from the United 
States to Israel. With the UK, it faces a country that will become its largest 
trading partner and one with over forty years of experience of working the 
corridors of Brussels. Even if the UK were to break-up into its four component 
parts, a possibility that while real should not be overplayed due to the 
potential cost for each part, England (which is 84 percent of the UK’s 
population) would remain one of Europe’s most populous and richest states. 
 Each of the options on the table for a new UK-EU relationship will therefore 
ultimately fail to varying degrees to cut out the EU’s involvement in British life 
in the way some Leave supporters might like. At the same time, they also 
mean they won’t cut the UK out of the life of the EU as some elsewhere in the 
EU might like. Reaching agreement over what new deal to take forward will be 
a diplomatic minefield of mega-proportions, and one neither side should relish 
because of the possible acrimony that it could bring for all concerned.42 It will 
also reveal that none of the options currently on the table can adequately deal 
with the scale and complexity of UK-EU relations. The EU is an evolving 
political process; its changing shape and direction means the UK-EU 
relationship will be in a constant state of flux.  
 
Even in the UK, where naturally the debate on Brexit has been the most 
extensive, most discussion about future relations has focused narrowly on 
trade. Discussion has often ignored the wider political, social and security 
relationships that connect Britain to its European home. This is despite the 
fact that even when it comes to trade, relations will likely vary from area to 
area, changing as both the UK and EU adapt and evolve in themselves, to 
say nothing of how they respond to their places in a wider and deeply 
interconnected transatlantic economic and political relationship.  
The UK-EU relationship has rarely been a stable or settled one. Opt-outs 
have been the most obvious manifestation of a relationship that has long been 
different shades of grey. Any new ‘out’ relationship will more than likely reflect 
                                                 
42 Morillas, Brexit Scenarios, 12-17. 
this more clearly, with darkness in areas where cooperation is minimal while 
others are light and filled with cooperation of varying kinds. 
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